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Abstract
From the Cold War until today, researchers and strategists have worked to find better
ways of understanding the strategic decisions of other countries. Many diplomats and
international decision makers subscribed to the idea that countries always acted rationally with
a rational, cost-benefit analysis approach to problems that laid before them. Others, however,
wished to explain the seemingly irrational actions countries have taken, and proposed that not
all countries share the same objective values and goals. Academic authors and political
strategists claimed that countries have Strategic Cultures, defined as frameworks that policy
makers operate within where they are influenced by cultural norms and traditions formulated
by their national communities. This thesis aims to evaluate the utility of Strategic Culture as an
international security methodology through a case study of Poland’s Strategic Culture, along
with relevant literature from, historians, military strategists, and relevant academic literature.
What this thesis found was that the influencing symbols, traditions, identities, etc. that
comprise a country’s Strategic Culture stem from an adopted historical narrative and that
narrative not only helps researchers understand the irrational decisions a country makes, but
also effects the decisions countries may make in the future. With these findings, the paper
concludes that Strategic Culture has utility insofar as the researcher has adequate
understanding of the dominant historical narrative the country they are analyzing has adopted.
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Introduction
Finding new ways to better understand and interact with other nations has long been
the goal of social scientists and politicians alike. Some academic writers and policymakers have,
over time, presented ideas and methodologies that may help readers understand why
particular countries act the way they do on the global stage. One such methodology is Strategic
Culture. Although Strategic Culture cannot fully explain and predict the actions of nations, this
does not mean that researchers cannot examine countries such as Poland through its lens to
help better understand the direction the country may head in the future.
The argument this paper presents is that at the foundation of a country’s strategic
decision is its identity, which is rooted in historical narrative. Different countries and cultures
have varying value structures that change their approach to their relations with other countries,
their policy decisions, and even their uses of force. Strategic Culture primarily focuses on what
shapes these value structures so that whenever a country becomes belligerent or a security
concern, national security administrators can better understand what the future actions and
goals of their opponent may be. This idea goes against the theories of rational choice like
Realism that attempt to argue that nations will always act in a way that is economically,
strategically, or politically beneficial to them in a zero-sum game format and that if we
objectively determine what those would be for that nation, we can determine their next move.
Nations, however, can make seemingly irrational decisions that can confuse outside observers
due to differences between the observer and the observed nation about what they view as
objectively valuable.
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To fully understand a nation’s cultural composition and value structure, however, one
must understand not only the nation’s history, but its narrative surrounding it. It is not enough
to simply know the physical events that happened in a country; a researcher must also
ascertain how the population understands and perceives the events in the present to get the
best glimpse of the source of that group’s identity. The significance that these groups give or
take away from certain events, along with how they present the stories they share about these
events, give researchers a clearer view into the actions of the examined nation. Therefore, this
paper hypothesizes that the seemingly irrational decisions a country makes, when examined in
context with their unique historical narrative, appear rational through that country’s
perspective in light of what happened to it in the past. Therefore, it would be in the best
interest of those using the tool of Strategic Culture to understand a country's historically
rooted, shared identity to understand the story that country tells about itself to best attempt to
find what the next chapter may hold.
The first chapter of this paper will give an overview of the progression of Strategic
Culture literature and how it has changed over time. The chapter begins by explaining how
Strategic Culture methodology began during the Cold War as United States strategists were
looking for ways to better understand and, consequently, gain an advantage over their Soviet
rivals. The chapter will then continue on to explain how Strategic Culture became the method
we recognize today, as an alternative to more deterministic worldviews such as Realism and a
methodology that has become ever more prevalent in International Security analyses.
Following the chronology of the progression of Strategic Culture, the chapter will present
Strategic Culture literature that focuses primarily on Poland. These studies will help the reader

3

relate this paper to other works of Strategic Culture that have had Poland as their subject of
study.
The following chapter, “The Forging of Narratives: How Identity is Created”, helps the
reader understand that the source of these value structures that Strategic Culture seeks to
understand is identity, which is formed by the historical narrative that a nation adopts. The
chapter opens with Linda Colley’s historical and cultural examination of Britain. The reason
Colley’s work is significant to this one is because of her methodology of examining a nation’s
identity and finding its ties to history. Colley argues that identity is adopted as a reaction to
historical interactions with the outside world. The chapter presents side-by-side examples of
how Britain and Poland historically formed their identities to shape their self-perception. This is
crucial to understand because if a nation’s identity is a reaction to the outside world, then it will
play a role in its international relations going forward.
How a nation perceives itself will dictate how it feels it should act when presented with
an issue. Anthropologist Clifford Geertz defines culture as “a system of inherited conceptions
expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop
their knowledge about and attitudes towards life.”1 The key word is “inherited”, which implies
that these traditions have links to the past and have a historical foundation. Geertz elaborates
this further in his metaphor of culture being “webs of significance” that are “historically
transmitted pattern[s] of meanings embodied in symbols”.2 If Geertz and Colley are correct,

1
2

Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays. New York: Basic Book, 1973. 89
Ibid., 89
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then the symbols, metaphors, traditions, etc. that form a nation’s identity, and that Strategic
Culture seeks to study and better understand, have a foundation that is rooted in history.
The third chapter seeks to answer the question, “Do historical narratives and collective
memory affect a country’s contemporary decision-making?” The chapter opens with Major
Kolton’s piece focusing on China’s recent interest in cybersecurity and cyberwarfare. Kolton, in
his piece, explains that China’s rapid advancements in cyberspace and approaches to their
domestic cyber policy are attributable to its view of Chinese history. Due to its fear of being
dominated again by an outside, Western, imperial force, China has subsequently taken steps to
bolster its military cyber divisions to dominate the internet domain. This method of examining
the effects of the past on current day policy and strategy is then applied to Poland in the
present day. The chapter explains that Poland’s historical narrative of abandonment stretches
back to the Second World War and beyond at many times throughout history. Poland was
promised protection by their allies in Western Europe that seemed to never materialize once
fighting commenced. In response, Poland is now taking more proactive measures to ensure its
security, which include military growth and diplomatic focus on the Eastern Partnership.
Poland, indeed, wishes to retain its relationship with its Western European E.U members, but
they also are taking increasingly more independent steps to guarantee national security that
can only be explained in context with historical precedent. These examples indicate to the
reader that historical memory has a deep influence over a nation’s policy decisions and makes
possible an argument for its importance in understanding a country’s strategic decisions.
The fourth chapter aims to answer two main questions regarding historical narrative
and its importance to Strategic Culture. Firstly, it tackles the question, “Where do the symbols,
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metaphors, and culture that Strategic Culture aims to understand have their root?” and does so
by demonstrating that the symbols Poland has adopted for itself stem from historical events
and interpretations of those events. Two primary examples that are examined are the Jasna
Gora Monastery and Pope John Paul II. The monastery is an example of a typical symbol, one
that is a physical structure that has more forms of meaning ascribed to it than one would
typically expect. John Paul II demonstrates a more unorthodox type of symbol. The Pope was
not a building or a flag, but a living person. Pope John Paul II’s symbolic importance to the
Polish people during their final years of Soviet domination can only be understood if
contextualized with the greater historical narrative that Poland wove for itself. Symbols can
take a variety of forms and can be adopted at any time. Thus it is important to understand the
incipience of these symbols so that when presented with one, the researcher can understand it
fully and in context.
The second question the fourth chapter aims to answer is, “Can historical narrative,
when used in a Strategic Culture format, help explain the more irrational actions a country
takes?” One of the main reasons Strategic Culture came about was the realization that
countries often do not act in ways that outside observers deem as objectively beneficial.
Strategic Culture, broadly speaking, argues that countries do not view every decision as a zerosum game and that they do not all agree upon what successful outcomes look like. A strategic
decision a country makes may seem totally irrational to outside researchers, but to the country
making the decision, however, it makes perfect sense when viewed alongside their adopted
narrative. Using Poland as a case study, examining their present-day friction with their EU
counterparts alongside a looming Russian threat, the chapter seeks to explain why Poland
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seems to take actions that are alienating the very same countries that they should be
cooperating with against an increasingly aggressive Russia. When examined through the lens of
Strategic Culture, Poland’s actions that seem counterintuitive to outside researchers find their
root cause in their cultural understanding of the country’s situation.
The final chapter will conclude the paper by discussing the utility of Strategic Culture
and addressing the findings of the research questions stated above. It will provide examples of
approaches that can be taken regarding Poland to achieve favorable outcomes for the
European Union going forward. If Strategic Culture has utility today, it should have the ability
to be applied to current day situations. Poland has immense European security importance due
to its geographic location and relationships in Eastern Europe, therefore, European Union
member states maintenance of a strong relationship with Poland should be a top priority. Also,
the examination of Poland seeks to prove that Strategic Culture can be applied to countries that
are not considered enemies or rivals. Any country, therefore, that has security importance to
others can have this methodology applied to an analysis of its international relations.

7

Chapter 1

Strategic Culture and Historical Narrative
Strategic Culture, The Concept
Defining Strategic Culture is crucial for contextualizing and understanding a country’s
decision-making. Strategic Culture’s definition is still a topic of debate that is usually over
Strategic Culture’s scope or utility. Alastair Iain Johnston in his book Cultural Realism: Strategic
Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History defined strategic culture as:
“An integrated system of symbols (e.g. argumentation, structures, languages, analogies,
metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting grand strategic
preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in
interstate political affairs, and by clothing these concepts with such an aura of factuality
that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious.”3
The definition given by Johnston helps outline the main goals of Strategic Culture, to see the
strategic choices from the perspective of the enemy. How a nation interacts with others in the
world of international politics, particularly regarding military force, has a precedent that is
grounded in that nation’s collective understanding. Any insight to better comprehend that
collective understanding would logically be of great importance to stay a step ahead of one’s
foes. This line of reasoning seeks to explain the seemingly irrational decisions countries makes
in their strategic decisions and to attract the attention of academics and military strategists
alike, who together could work to expand the scope of the methodology.
3

Alistair Johnston, ‘Thinking about Strategic Culture’, International Security 19/4 (Spring, 1995a), 46
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Strategic Culture first came to the forefront of international relations analyses during
the Cold War as the United States was aiming to understand and gain an edge over its Soviet
foe. Trying to understand the Soviet mindset with regards to its historical, geographical, and
ideological understandings and how that affected Soviet strategic goals became a hot topic
amongst international security analysts in the United States. This approach birthed schools of
thought that are outlined by authors whenever they dive into the subject. Usually, writings
regarding the effectiveness and definitions of Strategic Culture bring along with them historical
outlines that display the progression Strategic Culture has taken throughout the decades it has
been studied.
As is commonplace with works concerning Strategic Culture, a chronology of the
development of the concept is required for contextualization. Strategic Culture’s exact
definitions, applications, and goals have molded and shifted over time; therefore, it is crucial to
show its growth and help contextualize the current application. For example, Johnston
describes three generations of the Strategic Culture school of thought that took varying
approaches to their application of Strategic Culture.4 These progressing schools of thought
surrounding Strategic Culture display growth over the years from simply being a method to
analyze belligerent countries during a conflict to being a tool that can assist in other areas, such
as foreign policy and national security.
Following the conclusion of the Second World War, the United States, along with its
allies, found itself engaged in a geopolitical struggle with the Soviet Union and its bloc. The
conflict primarily took the form of non-conventional types of warfare, the most notable form
4

Ibid. 36
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being the nuclear arms race that most people associate with the time period. As both sides
were trying to find ways to gain the upper hand, Jack Snyder in his 1977 report “The Soviet
Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations” laid the foundation for what we
now recognize as Strategic Culture.
In Snyder’s report, he began by openly declaring that the report was not an attempt to
precisely predict the next move of the Soviets, and that he believed that more precise data
related to a specific case would be necessary to attempt a prediction.5 He instead argued that
this approach could be used to help United States policymakers better understand their
opponent’s line of reasoning. The issue was that American policymakers were assuming that
the Soviet Union policymakers were following the same line of thinking that they were. In
short, they were projecting the values, rationality, and cost-benefit analysis from an American
perspective onto the Soviets and assuming that the Soviets were seeking the same ends as they
were. Snyder points out that,
“Neither Soviet nor American strategists are culture-free, pre-conception-free, game
theorists. Soviet and American doctrines have developed in different organizational,
historical, and political contexts […] As a result, the Soviets and Americans have asked
somewhat different questions about the use of nuclear weapons and have developed
answers that differ in significant aspects”.6

5

Jack L. Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1977), pg. v. https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R2154.html. (Date accessed: 15
August 2022)
6
Ibid., v
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Snyder was clearly differentiating the approaches that American strategists were using to
understand their Soviet opponents. One side, those that subscribed to the school of Realism
believed that simply measuring what the best logical decision is based on a risk versus reward
analysis was the best way to get a clear picture of what an enemy’s future actions and goals
may be. This Realist analysis, however, did not satisfy people such as Snyder, who questioned if
everyone had the same “logical” approach to situations as he did. This doubt opened the door
for future generations to add more wrinkles to the world of international relations analysis.
The second generation, according to Johnston, was a tad more skeptical than its
predecessor. What they argued was that strategic culture was something that is cultivated by
the ruling parties of a country to justify to their populace the actions they take. Although this
line of thinking may come across as cynical, it does have utility for those wishing to use the lens
of Strategic Culture to better understand the country in question. Culture and identity are
aspects of a country that are created by the people living within them. Perhaps in a more
totalitarian state where the government has controlled information and communication for a
number of years, the second generation of Strategic Culturists would have a sound example of
a nation whose identity is selected by a small group of people in power. It is usually the case,
however, that identity and the interpretation of history come from the people as they must
agree to the narrative to share among themselves and pass it down to others in the future.
The third generation of Strategic Culture thinking sought to expand the utility of the
method to other aspects of international relations. Writers, such as Johnston, looked to expand
Strategic Culture into other areas such as international security and relationship building. This
allowed for Strategic Culture to be more than simply a wartime endeavor, thusly bringing it into
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the realm of preventative action. If stable relationships can be maintained with other countries
by gaining a greater understanding of their goals and thought processes, then perhaps conflict
could be avoided.

Identity and the State
Poland, following the Second World War, found itself devastated by the destruction
wrought upon them by invading forces. Symbolic cities such as Warsaw and Wroclaw were
razed to the ground and the Polish people knew their country required reconstruction. This
reconstruction process, however, would not be solely architectural. The Polish socialist
governments, and people themselves, set a goal of rebuilding Poland societally as well as
physically. The reconstruction of Poland went deeper than simply laying bricks to rebuild the
cities; it was a societal project to shape a new Polish state with a new national identity that
would be ethnically and culturally “Polish”. Poland, therefore, began to form new narratives
that would contextualize who they were as a nation and as a state in this post-war world.
Before diving into Poland’s restructuring of its society and country, however, it would be wise
to clarify important terms.
A large range of academics and political scientists have delved into complex questions of
national identity, ethnic identity, and the state. These three topics usually come up in
conversation together as the first two topics typically lead to discussions regarding the
formation of the third. It seems appropriate to talk about the national and ethnic identities first
to lay a foundation for discussions about their relation to statehood and wrap up the
conversation with how they become muddied in the state-building process.
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Greenfeld and Eastwood in their article “National Identity” discuss the idea of national
identity and how it relates to politics and everyday life. They define national identity as a
secular, egalitarian identity that recognizes the state as a sovereign entity that carries the will of
the people.7 The government is legitimate because it is popularly supported by a people who
believe it will carry out their will and are all equal under its rule. This representation of the
state seems noble and legitimate to most, but problems arise when the question is asked: who
is a part of this nation? This question is answered in the form of nationalism, which is either
political/civic or it is cultural/ethnic in nature.8
This idea of nationalism gives rise to the question of ethnicity and its role in state
formation. Ethnicity, according to Chandra, is “an arbitrary set of categories in which descentbased categories are necessary for membership”.9 She explains that aspects such as shared
language or religion can play a part in ethnic identity as it primarily is based on descent from a
distinguishable group of people. These ethnicities are usually rallying points for a type of
cultural or ethnic nationalism that is used to unite those in a national identity of an ethnically
based nation-state. Greenwood and Eastwood indicate that those cultures that arise out of
ethnic, collectivistic nationalism typically are more prone to ethnic violence.10

7

Liah Greenfeld and Jonathan Eastwood, “National Identity,” in Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, eds.,
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 258.
8
Ibid., 268-269
9
Kanchan Chandra, “Making Causal Claims About the Effect of ‘Ethnicity’” in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S.
Zuckerman, eds., Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, 2 nd Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2009. 377
10

Liah Greenfeld and Jonathan Eastwood, “National Identity,” in Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, eds.,
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 258.
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Unfortunately, most states following the First World War were conceived on this basis.
Migdal in his article “Researching the State” explains that the collapse of multi-national empires
after the First World War resulted in the formation of European ethno-states that grasped onto
an ethnic identity for legitimacy.11 Concerning their national identity, the new states used the
ethnicity of the majority of the population to satisfy the claim of sovereignty as the state was
formed to actualize the will of the ethnic majority it was serving.12 This led to the unfortunate
situations like Romania in which Romanians were given priority due to their comprising of an
ethnic majority in the country, while sizeable minorities of Jews, Gypsies, Germans, etc. found
themselves at the bottom of the totem pole.13 This dissolving of the cosmopolitan imperial
identity of intrinsically multi-national empires into ethnically based nation-states would lead to
the ethnic violence (exemplified by riots, pogroms, and civil wars), that Varshney says arises out
of circumstances that allow ethnic tensions to boil over. The violence arises logically in these
cases. If national identity is inherently egalitarian, why should those minorities be considered
equal to the majority ethnicity? They do not have the general will of “the people” in mind, they
have their own ethnicity’s interests at heart. Election systems and constitutional structures
that span across ethnic lines make for a nation and a society that focuses less on ethnic identity
and more on civic identity, which typically causes fewer cases of ethnic conflict.14 Poland,
however, did not go the route Varshney describes and focused on solidifying their ethnicity and

11

Joel Migdal, “Researching the State” in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds., Comparative Politics:
Rationality, Culture, and Structure. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.) 169-170
12
Ashutosh Varshney, “Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict” in Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, eds.,
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009),277
13
Joel Migdal, “Researching the State” in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds., Comparative Politics:
Rationality, Culture, and Structure. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.) 170
14
Ashutosh Varshney, “Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict” in Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, eds.,
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 290
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culture into the foundation of their new state. This would lead to violent outcomes, such as
mass expulsions and ethnic cleansing, that one would expect from the ethnic tensions Varshney
described.
Poland in Strategic Culture
Poland and its international decisions have garnered the attention of academic writers
who view Strategic Culture as a useful avenue for understanding the country’s disposition.
Poland geographically, historically, and politically has drawn many writers to closely examine
the country’s culture to see what can be learned. One of the aims of this paper is to join this
conversation and see what can be learned about Strategic Culture through studying Poland.
Author Christopher Reeves in his article “Contemporary Strategic Culture: An Analysis of
the 2020 National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland” dives into the topic of Poland’s
Strategic Culture. He details constants that run through Poland’s strategic decisions, such as
perceptions of an always-hostile Russia to the East.15 Regarding Poland and Russia’s troubled
relationship, he quotes an author, R. Taras, who states, “Over the centuries mutual
vindications, irredentist claims, cultural chasms, incompatible value systems, religious and
philosophic conflicts, and other historical grievances have created reciprocal suspicion, distrust,
dislike and, at times, hatred.”16 Both Reeves and Taras realize the importance of cultrual
differences between countries and that these differences have an impact on strategic decisions
made by ruling elites.

15

Christopher Reeves, “Discerning Poland’s Contemporary Strategic Culture: an Analysis of the 2020 National
Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland,” Politeja, no. 75 (2021): 288 https://www.jstor.org/stable/27111785.
(Date Accessed 20 September 2022)
16
Raymond Taras, Fear and the Making of Foreign Policy. (Edinburgh University Press 2015): p. 114
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Reeves, in his article, states that his methodology stems from the fourth generation of
Strategic Culture writings, which primarily focuses on understanding changes in a country’s
Strategic Culture by recognizing the underlying competing subcultures.17 He, along with other
fourth-generation writers, look to account for changes in a country’s strategic decisions while
dismissing a monolithic view of that country’s strategic methods. The author of this thesis
mostly agrees with this approach, but would add that these competing subcultures are firstly
competing over the predominant historical narrative. In Reeves’ article, he details a debate
between Polish strategists prior to the Second World War regarding who was the bigger
external threat to their country, Russia or Germany. Both sides looked to history to bolster
their arguments. Although they had the same historical facts, the narratives surrounding those
facts were the driving force for the decisions they would make. The emphasis they would place
on certain events and the dismissal of others is at the heart of the strategic mindset they would
adopt. Debates and struggles between varying subcultures aiming to become the dominant
culture are always debated from a particular narrative; thus understanding these narratives are
crucial to understanding the entirety of a country’s Strategic Culture.
Other authors, such as Kerry Longhurst, also have taken steps to understand Poland’s
Strategic Culture. Longhurst focused many of her writings on Poland’s strategic aims following
events such as the Iraq War and the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks on the World Trade Center, primarily
in their relationship with the United States. In an article she published alongside Marcin
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Christopher Reeves, “Discerning Poland’s Contemporary Strategic Culture: an Analysis of the 2020 National
Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland,” Politeja, no. 75 (2021): 286 https://www.jstor.org/stable/27111785.
(Date Accessed: 20 September 2022)
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Zaborowski, she describes Poland as the United States’ “protégé” in the East.18 In the article, it
details how the United States and Poland’s similar values and ideas regarding multilateral,
multinational governmental structures brought them together. Unlike the clashing of values
Poland historically has had with Russia, Longhurst shares how similar value alignments can lead
to seemingly unforeseeable alliances.
Readers of Longhurst’s article will notice, just as Reeves claimed earlier, that the
dominant Strategic Culture is not monolithic and is up for debate within respective countries.
Longhurst notes that Poland is torn between “old world” thinking, which is primarily focused on
national defense, and “new world” thinking which is focused more on international security. 19
The logical path forward for Poland seems clear: to adopt new world strategic initiatives that
will build strong alliances, primarily with NATO, to ensure the security of Europe and
themselves from external threat as well as enhance economic opportunity within these
parameters. There is, however, something drawing Polish decision makers back to “old world”
thinking which prioritizes national defense that is more individualist in nature and thus less
cooperative with Poland’s Western neighbors. What this thesis aims to demonstrate is that any
country’s Strategic Culture ultimately stems from its historical narrative. If Poland simply
operated off of historical facts, it would simply adopt this “new world” strategy and link arms
with NATO and the EU. Longhurst explains the reasoning for holding on to the traditional
national defense approach for Poland can be found in themes such as abandonment and
Poland’s collective feeling of vulnerability. Poland’s view of the past as one where the country
18

Kerry Longhurst and Marcin Zaborowski, “America’s Protégé in the East? The Emergence of Poland as a Regional
Leader.” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 79, no. 5 (2003): 1009
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3568950. (Date Accessed: 29 September 2022)
19
Ibid., 1010
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is abandoned by the West and thus is left to valiantly, though hopelessly, fight for itself against
stronger foes pervades Polish strategic thinking to this day. Therefore, for Strategic Culture
analysis of Poland or any country to have utility, it must have a firm understanding of not only
the history of the country in question but also the country’s collective narrative about its past
that it has chosen for itself.
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Chapter 2

The Forging of Narratives: How Identity is Created
Cultural Identity as an Historical Product
Before exploring how Poland and other countries form their identity around their
narratives, it is crucial to understand the link between collective memory and a culture’s
identity. Authors such as Jan Assmann and John Czaplicka have demonstrated links between a
country’s identity and their collective memory. Assmann and Czaplicka state in their article
“Collective Memory and Cultural Identity” that “Cultural Memory has its fixed point; its horizon does
not change with the passing of time. These fixed points are fateful events of the past whose
memory is maintained through cultural formation (texts, rites, monuments).”20 Here, the authors
argue that the symbols, expressions, and traditions that form a culture have a “fixed point” that is
located in a nation’s memory of the past. Continuing on, they state that “In cultural formation, a
collective experience crystallizes, whose meaning, when touched upon, may suddenly become
accessible again across millennia.”21 The authors conclude that this crystallized collective memory
then becomes passed down through oral traditions and other symbolic representations, which form
a culture, and thus an identity for those who accept the story as one that connects them to the past.
A country’s identity is a key concept that one must grasp when analyzing its Strategic Culture.
Philosohpers such as Edmund Husserl noted that one’s sense of self is created as a reaction to those

20

Jan Assmann and John Czaplicka, “Collective Memory and Cultural Identity.” New German Critique, no. 65
(1995): 129. https://doi.org/10.2307/488538. (Date Accessed: 19 September 2022)
21
Ibid., 129
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outside of himself or herself.22 This concept would then be applied to nations by writers such as
Edward Said who in his work Orientalism claimed that nations create identities by differentiating
themselves from groups they see as the “Other”.23 If identity, then, is a response to the outside
world, it also helps a country’s decision makers rationalize how they must interact with that outside
world in conjunction with other factors such as national public opinion and attitudes. Therefore, it is
vitally important that when a researcher is studying a country’s Strategic Culture that they
understand how that country’s historically rooted identity was formulated. Once that identity is
grasped, then the researcher will have the best chance of understanding not only how the country
being studied views itself, but also how it believes it should act externally when presented with
issues.
British Popular History as a Source of Culture
A critical aspect of Strategic Culture is understanding a nation’s history. History is a key
component to understanding a country’s identity, as conceived popular recollection and
response to the past is a key factor in understanding what future actions they could make later.
Historians have, therefore, used their findings to better understand a nation’s identity and how
it was formed through collective memory. A great example is Linda Colley and how her study of
popular British culture helped provide valuable insight not only into how the idea of what is
“British” was formed, but also what this formed idea could potentially mean for the country
moving forward. This methodology will then be used to examine Poland, as both the United
22

William Cornwell, “Making Sense of the Other: Husserl, Carnap, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein.” 20th WCP:
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Kingdom and Poland have similar positions of being important players in Europe whilst also
being countries that struggle with integrating policy with their Western European allies.
Britain’s understanding of its geopolitical position can of course be explained through
economic or international political factors, but the social and cultural factors require some
attention as well. The construction of British identity has been a well-documented area of
study by a plethora of scholars. One of the prominent voices in this discussion is Linda Colley,
primarily with her book Britons. Although her book focuses on Britain in the years 1707-1837,
the insights gleaned from her societal analysis shed some light on British identity today. Colley
argues in her work that works which focus only on elites, such as traditional top-down histories,
or ones that focus on rebellious lower classes, such as Marxist writers including E.P Thompson,
are limited in scope when trying to learn about popular British culture. Most of the country
was not this rebellious, impoverished lower class nor were they all wealthy statesmen, and they
usually were very supportive of their emerging Empire. The question arises, what did they form
their identity around, and what is “Britishness”? Colley’s findings suggest that perhaps British
identity is not so much formed around what Britishness ‘is’ but more what it ‘is not’.
Through her study of British popular culture in the form of newspapers, political
cartoons, poems, and other written cultural artifacts, Colley shows that Britishness was typically
created in opposition to an Other. Colley states promptly in her introduction that “Britishness
was superimposed over an array of internal differences in response to contact with the Other,
and above all in response to contact with the Other.”24 She shows strong examples in support
of that statement in the later chapters. Great Britain found itself in conflict with other
24
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European powers that usually resulted in combat and their regular opponent during the 17 th
and early 18th centuries was France. Colley explains three examples that separated Great
Britain and France important to the later construction of British identity. These were Religion,
Royalty, and Parliament. Firstly, with religion, the British would rally around their AnglicanProtestant faith against the Roman Catholic French. The British formed this idea of Providence,
and that God was looking over them and their endeavors. “What better image could there be
of a Protestant citadel being safe guarded amidst Armageddon by the watchful eye of
Providence?”25 The British rallied around their Protestant faith and belief that they were in
God’s favor even up until World War Two where British belief in Providence was reinforced by
the miraculous evacuation at Dunkirk. The British were not always particularly fond of the
monarchy, but following the revolutions in the United States, and especially France, where they
desired to cast off their royal rulers, Britain became more supportive of their own.26 Finally,
they began parliamentary reforms and even freed slaves to differentiate themselves from the
United States.27 Britain became especially skilled at showing who they were not, but no so
much at saying who they were, and when they ran out of military opponents, they had to look
elsewhere for people to classify as “Other”.
This all relates to Britain’s troubles with the European Union, and the search for a new
“Other” may have just been supplanted with a healthy import of recent Eastern European
immigration. Colley writes at the end of this book, “Whereas the Germans and French still tend
to see a Europe without frontiers in terms of opportunity, the British […] are more inclined to
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view it as a threat[…] many of them fear assuming a new identity in case it obliterates entirely
the already insecure identity they currently possess.”28 The opening of Europe and European
labor immigration may have seemed wonderful to many European states, but Colley argues
that Britain, with its identity lacking solid foundation, did not see it the same way. This
question is something Britain is grappling with and it even found its way to the Oxford debate
floor. Douglas Murray, a conservative British author and speaker, argued in 2014 that mass
immigration was bad for Britain as it watered down their sense of “Britishness” and that the
rate of immigration coming into the country would change the country to something
different.29 John Cleese, the famous Monty Python comic, was cited saying that London was
not really an English city anymore.30 What constitutes Britishness and identity for the people of
the United Kingdom is not the focus of this paper, but what is important to glean from this
information is that Britons feel they are losing their identity and recent immigration policy is
now to blame. UKIP has now given the British people the “enemy from without” that they have
lacked for many years, and it comes in the form of foreign, Eastern European immigrants, who
coincidentally are predominantly Poles, and the European Union that is responsible for sending
them to Britain.
It must be noted that just as British identity can be malleable, so can their ideas of the
“Other”. Colley notes that identity is not similar to hats; although people can change hats at
their leisure depending on the circumstance, people can adopt many different identities
28
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simultaneously and they can morph at any moment.31 Simply put, a nation is not forced to be
subscribed to a singular identity. An identity a citizenry adopts can be selected or cast off at any
time and can be held in conjunction with other identifiers that are viewed as desirable to the
populace.
Colley ends the book discussing the path Britain may find itself on after analyzing the
British past and delving into British cultural understandings. She felt that Britain’s long held
belief that they are separate from Europe geographically and culturally, coupled with the
growing cohesion between European Union states that Britain found itself to be a member of,
may one day lead Britain to seek to separate itself from Europe altogether. This was a stark
claim not only because it came from a historian, but because it came many years before the U.K
would sever its ties with the EU. Very few people at the time the book was written in 1992
even conceived of a European Union without the U.K, but Colley gleaned something from her
research that caused her to see an outcome many did not. One of the strongest examples was
Colley’s exposition of the rallying of the British around their Protestant faith. They felt that God
had a special plan for Britain and that favorable outcomes in times of tribulation pointed to
Divine Providence for a nation set apart. This idea of a nation set apart would help fuel
sentiments later that Britain deserved to be on its own, as separated from external European
influence as possible. Although Britain leaving the European Union has not brought
considerable security concerns for Europe, in the short term, could another country separating
itself from the European Union have more weight in terms of overall security? Seeing how
Britain forged its identity over time and created a narrative for itself through its telling of
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national history and desire to differentiate itself from its neighbors, can the same method be
used to understand Poland’s narrative and perhaps forecast a future path for the country?32
The Reformation of Polish Identity
The Polish experience following the Second World War has lasting effects that permeate
Polish culture and memory today. Poland in the aftermath of the World Wars began rethinking
how to perceive itself and the world around it. Scholars and historians have detailed Poland’s
cultural transition after the conclusion of World War II and the collective memory of the events
that shaped the national consciousness going forward.
`Gregor Thum in his book Uprooted tells the story of how the Polish leadership following
World War Two looked to reconstruct Poland by focusing on the transformation of the German
city of Breslau into the Polish city of Wroclaw. The most effective way to understand the
history of the city would be through the title of Thum’s concluding chapter “Amputated
Memory”. A myth was pushed by Polish communist governments following the Second World
War that Poland was an ethnically homogenous land that was dominated by Polish customs and
demographics. This myth of “eternal Polishness”, as Thum terms it, was created by the
communist government to claim legitimacy over newly acquired Western lands, Wroclaw
included, that it feared would potentially fall back into German hands. This would lead to a
series of actions designed to reconstruct Poland and its cities in a way that reflected this myth
and provided legitimacy to the new communist-dominated government. Firstly, an ethnic
cleansing campaign of Germans took place, removing not only German people themselves but
32
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also placing Poles in a majority of positions of power to help them gain and retain influence.33
Mass expulsions according to Thum were “notorious” for their methods and “damaged Poland’s
international reputation”.34 The post-war years not only saw the mass deportations of
Germans but Ukrainians as well. In Wroclaw, German street names were changed and the city
that used to be the religious hub of Protestants, Catholics, and Jews became predominantly
Catholic. The Polish ‘takeover’ seemed from the outset to be complete as traces of other
cultures, from people to the city’s name, were gradually erased and replaced. This raises a
question that Thum addresses, how successful were these attempts at creating an ethnically
homogenous state of Poland?
Thum’s chapter “Impermanence Syndrome” is particularly powerful as myths
perpetuated by the communist government that surely are still held by some Poles today are
debunked by the author. The people that the state called upon to migrate to Western Poland
were not all brave pioneers who fully believed in the work they were doing. Many of them did
not even recognize where they were as part of Poland and wondered if they could leave
Wroclaw and return to somewhere “in Poland.35 The migrants came from all over, a “Motley
Crew” of settlers as Thum terms them that spoke different dialects, lived different lifestyles,
and often did not have positive views of one another. Looters (szabrownicy) raided old houses
and stores, leading to even more distrust amongst the population, and those from differing
parts of Poland that came to settle in Wroclaw questioned the “Polishness” of those who did
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not come from their region.36 The Polish communist narrative of an ethnically homogenous,
unified group of pioneers that came confidently to rebuild Wroclaw from the ground up does
not hold up under close examination. This raises more questions, however: just how effective
was the communist regime at implementing its policies?
Padraic Kenney in his book Rebuilding Poland details the struggles of the Polish
communist regime to dominate the everyday Polish workers ideologically and socially. Kenney
in this book seeks to critique the outdated concept of totalitarianism and totalitarian rule
within Polish society. Totalitarian rule is characterized not only by complete state control of the
government and policy, but also of society as well. The communist regime was originally
thought to have a totalitarian grip over Poland in the post-war years and was the primary
shaper of Polish society after the war. This book challenges this belief, however. The
communist regime had to constantly enter negotiations with the population that was
constantly resisting perceived encroachments on their ways of life and work. Kenney states,
“The regime did not simply impose its will on a passive population; in industry, it had to cope
with major strike waves, endemic labor turnover and insubordination, often hostile prewar
traditions, and serious economic shortcomings.”37 The communist regime was in constant
contention with the culture of the Polish workers and was wrestling for influence among the
people. Kenney states, “the elimination of class in the public sphere allowed it to resurface in
the private sphere within social relations outside of work […] In church, on the streets, and
sometimes in the factories, workers showed that class remained a category of identity. This
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was the Polish communists’ greatest failure.”38 Many of their plans would backfire, such as
labor competitions that were needed to increase production but also went against Marxist
dogma and thus played more into creating a culture of resistance that would continue on until
the eventual collapse of communist rule.”39
These two books create an interesting dialogue and raise some intriguing questions.
Just how much influence did the common Polish citizen have on the reshaping of Poland
following World War II? Thum seems to approach the radical changes from a top-down
perspective and cites the Polish communist government programs of resettlement and
‘Polonizing’ as the main reasons for the change in Poland’s society. He does mention everyday
Poles refusing to return stolen goods to Holocaust survivors, but mostly it is the policies of mass
expulsion and institutional changes that, in Thum’s view, shaped Poland after the war. Kenney
takes a different approach, putting the workers in the spotlight and showing the difficulty the
Polish communists had in dominating and changing Polish society due to lingering traditions. I
would argue both vantage points need to be taken seriously. Firstly, there was an authoritarian
regime ruling over post-war Poland that implemented strategies to recreate Poland according
to its vision as ethnically homogenous and culturally Polish. Yet, there was also popular
resistance to this regime whenever something that was felt to be unjust. People create
communities and identities for themselves, and the changes in society that created an
ethnically and culturally homogenous Poland were brought upon by the communist rulers and
ordinary Poles. The importance of this literature is to realize that the myths of Poland always
being a land solely of Poles and that they were completely suppressed under a ruthless
38
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communist government are both problematic when scrutinized. The Poles resisted the
communist government when they felt they needed to, but also negotiated with it and
sometimes profited from communist rule. The stories that these authors tell bring a more
complex view of post-war Poland that opens the door for many more interesting discussions.
In short, the reconstruction of Poland went deeper than rebuilding decimated cities, it
was a societal project to shape a new Polish state with a new national identity that would be
ethnically and culturally “Polish”. Studying the changes in society in Poland after the Second
World War ends reveals the dark side of post-war Europe that brought continued ethnic
cleansing and violence, along with the complex features of eastern bloc countries acclimating to
communist rule.
Influencing the Present
Although the Soviet-backed Communist regime that facilitated the national myths of
Poland’s identity has since lost its control over the country, this does not mean these myths left
with it. Part of Poland’s identity as a culturally and ethnically homogenous state puts it at odds
with its western European Union neighbors, who logically should be its allies. The current Law
and Justice government of Poland often cites the values of their Western neighbors as
antithetical to their own. This has led to statements from prominent PiS politicians that have
increasingly become more isolationist than unifying with regard to Poland and its relationship
with the European Union.
The Prime Minister of Poland, Mateusz Morawiecki once stated “So for Europe to be
strong, it has to be a ‘Europe of homelands’. It cannot be one superpower, because if that is the
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case, there will be frictions and tensions that are going to grow[...] We can be a superpower,
but without this meaning a one-size-fits-all type of philosophy that some Eurocrats from
Brussels seem to believe in.”40 He also more recently stated following a meeting of European
Populist leaders in Warsaw that Poland is looking for external allies in light of a more
“centralized Europe”.41 This resistance to increased European Union integration stems from
concerns that European Union law is superseding Poland’s laws if the two conflict. Polish
leaders feel this is a threat to national sovereignty if a large, federalized body is the entity with
the final say in a legal dispute. This type of rhetoric is not new for anyone that has followed
European Union developments with regard to the United Kingdom and its ‘Brexit’ movement.
The United Kingdom in 2020 formally severed its ties with the European Union, which it viewed
as an outside, controlling force that had too much influence over United Kingdom policy.
Poland and Britain have had historical ties and a legacy of cooperation between them, and now
with Poland’s close ally outside of the European Union, there have been small rumblings of a
potential ‘Polexit’ within the country over similar grievances.
Considering these facts, the utility of Strategic Culture comes into question. Poland’s
actions that were detailed earlier regarding their geo-political policy make perfect sense in light
of their past regarding larger superpowers invading their country while simultaneously being
abandoned by their allies. Naturally, one would assume that they would want to build strong
relationships with their West European counterparts, give more attention to their own military
40
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capabilities, while also building strong relationships with countries to the East that could form a
buffer between them and the ever-growing aggression of present-day Russia. On the other
hand, their comments concerning a more independent Poland and forming a bloc with more
populist governments seems to be counterintuitive, but it also falls in line with historical
context as well.
Poland’s history may give it a reason to be skeptical of its Western neighbors. Poland’s
fear of abandonment has caused its political leaders to try and rebuild their connections with
their Western counterparts, but it also has pushed them to take more independent steps
simultaneously. The country took steps internally to increase military capacity and externally
by creating and leading partnerships with their Eastern neighbors to add layers to their
defensive foundation. With their tentativeness to put full faith in their allies, the country’s
history of subjugation that came from their western German neighbor, and the cultural
differences Poland also has with Western Europe, Poland has also found itself at odds with the
EU and has taken steps that seem to contradict its historical desire to unite with their
democratic allies against Russian domination. The best way to understand this is to understand
that historical memory is not only comprised of events, like battles and treaty signings, but also
popular culture as well.
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Chapter 3

Historical Memory and Geo-Politics
China in Cyberspace: Strategic Culture and Its Ties to the Past
For Strategic Culture to have utility, it must have a tangible connection to the present
day. It is beneficial for Strategic Culture researchers to understand the historical narratives,
symbols, and identities that countries have adopted for themselves only if these aspects affect
decisions the countries make today. What this chapter intends to do is present an example of a
present-day military strategist using his understanding of a country’s historical narrative to
better understand that country’s Strategic Culture, then apply that same methodology to
Poland. This approach will demonstrate the links between a country’s historical narrative, their
Strategic Culture, and their actual decisions on the world stage.
Major Michael Kolton in his article "Interpreting China’s Pursuit of Cyber Sovereignty and
Its Views on Cyber Deterrence" used Strategic Culture to explain China’s current policy goals
concerning cyberspace.42 He links China’s traditional cultural values and memory with its
communist leadership’s international strategy. He details why it would be difficult as an
American to understand China’s actions regarding its internet policies, namely because each
country’s cultures and histories would, by default, lead us to different conclusions. Concepts
such as freedom and how warfare should be conducted come into question as the value
structures located within the differing populaces and their decision makers vary between China
and the United States. Kolton in his paper contextualizes the culture and history of China
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alongside their present-day policies to help not only understand what China’s potential future
endeavors may be but also what solutions could be reached to help achieve a better
understanding between the two powers.
Kolton begins by tackling China’s policy of Cyber Sovereignty. There are information and
internet sources that China does not wish to allow its citizens to view as they feel it could be
harmful to the regime. To outsiders, particularly those in America and the West, this comes
across as government censorship and, therefore, distastefully authoritarian. The free-flowing
of information that ensures the best chance for a more educated populace and increased
communication between allies seems like a very logical idea to most Westerners and
quintessential to a current-day free society. To China, Kolton explains, this free flow of
information is not freedom, it instead is a threat to freedom. Freedom to the Chinese ruling
party is much more centered around China being free to be sovereign over itself and govern as
it so chooses. China historically has had a history of isolationism that spans back thousands of
years, and the sentiment of China operating as independently as possible from outside
influence is still very much prevalent. China looks at examples, such as Iran, where political
instability and unrest were fueled by United States interventionism, made possible by the
openly accessible internet that the United States uses to spread its influence.43 From China’s
perspective, if the United States can use the open-forum of the internet to influence a populace
to dispose of the ruling party that the United States does not support, is a country like China
secure in its sovereignty? Are the Chinese free to live and govern as they see fit, or is a country
only free to operate as long as the United States sees it as cooperative? China, therefore, has
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launched campaigns not only on its domestic front to retain more control of its own
cyberspace, but also has shifted attention to the world stage with a policy that includes a more
robust cyberwarfare arm of its military.
Sun Tzu, a famous Chinese tactician and historical figure, encouraged winning wars
before they even came to the battlefield and appearing weak to the enemy when it had the
advantage. Kolton ties this to China’s desire to put a large amount of its spending towards the
cyber-warfare divisions of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA). This would allow China to
gain the advantage before they would have to engage in combat while at the same time
appearing less equipped for battle because it is not building a traditional military. It also runs
deeper in China’s historical memory with outsiders why Chinese leaders would want to control
cyberspace. China’s central committee claimed that cyberspace is the new frontier, and that
whichever country grabs control of it will dominate world affairs.44 Kolton states, “British
dominance of the high seas allowed European powers to subjugate the Qing Dynasty, and many
Chinese citizens still chafe under US Navy patrols of global sea lanes-especially the South China
Sea. Given China’s collective trauma from past imperialism, the PLA will not allow history to
repeat in the cyberspace; it will defend China’s sovereignty in the cyber domain.”45 Kolton
firmly believes that the Chinese share a collective trauma of imperialism and abuse from
outside European superpowers and will do everything they can to prevent similar experiences
in the future. He, therefore, suggests that actions be taken to better understand the other side
to prevent the chance of miscommunication which could lead to escalation of an already tense
situation.
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One of the issues of strategic culture literature is its limited scope related to its
perceived utility. Strategic Culture primarily focuses on other countries’ decision-making
almost exclusively within the realm of warfare. This, of course, is to be expected with the
creation of this methodology materializing during a time of looming international conflict and
destruction. Attempting to understand one’s enemy to know which military move they are
going to make beforehand was seen as principally important, and perhaps logically so. Another
argument this thesis will make is that Strategic Culture can not only be helpful in understanding
another country’s potential use of force, but it also can help to understand the goals and
desires of the other country to build a better relationship with it, thus opening the door for a
more diplomatic solution to contentious issues.
Abandonment: Poland’s Memory in Action
Authors like Kolton and Johnston opened the door and showed examples of how
Strategic Culture can be used in the realm of international security; thus, this case study of
Poland will attempt to use Strategic Culture to better understand another nation that is not
considered an adversary. Poland, from the perspective of the West, is not considered an active
threat to its security or interests. What this paper will seek to do is use Strategic Culture to
analyze the decision-making of a state’s political leadership to learn more about its collective
experiences and where that country may be going in the future. A large aspect of international
security is prevention; to foresee possible scenarios on the horizon that could lead to
traditional security responses (particularly military responses) and taking active steps to avoid
those scenarios. Poland was chosen not only due to the fact it is not currently considered a
threat to the West like China or Russia, but it was also chosen for its geographical and cultural
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significance. Geographically, Poland sits in the center between what is considered traditionally
Western Europe and Eastern Europe. As Norman Davies succinctly articulated: “All debates
about Poland’s international relations were dominated by her unenviable location between
Germany and Russia.”46 Many times, historically, Poland was used as a bridge for Western and
Eastern European armies to pass through to reach the other side, usually with devastating
results for the Polish population. An unstable relationship with Poland could risk a situation of
deteriorating communication and thus lead the way for an opportunity from a growing Russian
threat. Culturally, Poland has strong relationships with many Eastern European countries that
were part of the former Soviet Bloc. An “Eastern Partnership” has recently formed between
the E.U and other Eastern states, such as Ukraine in which Poland has taken an active role in
spearheading relations. Deterioration of relations with Poland could potentially lead to a
domino effect where other Eastern states begin to follow suit. Ensuring Poland’s fraternity and
cooperation with its European Union allies is of high importance for the overall security of
Europe.
As it pertains to the geopolitical relations of Poland and its Eastern neighbors, Strategic
Culture seems to be a very effective way to understand their courses of action. Poland’s
historical ties with the region, along with a common collective trauma because of SovietRussian and Nazi-German oppression, project a clear picture of Poland’s current relations with
their eastern neighbors. Understanding Poland’s history of foreign occupation by other
European powers and its identity in relation to that time period helps researchers and analysts
understand the Polish point of view.
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On September 1 of 1939, Germany, under the rule of Adolph Hitler and the Nazi Party,
invaded Poland and officially started the Second World War. Shortly following the invasion,
Soviet-Russian forces would invade Poland from the east and place Poland in a two-front war
that it had no chance of winning.47 The German army was technologically and strategically
superior to the newly conscripted Polish Army that stood in its way of further expansion 48, and
the Russian Army was a larger fighting force compared to their Polish counterparts who were
now stretched thin by a two-front attack. The Polish Army put forward its best defensive effort,
only to be completely overrun and forced to surrender unconditionally. What followed the
surrender of Poland is considered one of, if not the darkest periods of Polish history, their 20th
century loss of independence to occupying forces. Nazi Germany’s occupation of Poland, both
before and after Operation Barbarossa against the Soviet Union, led to atrocities, such as forced
resettlements and murder, committed against the population of Poland, especially its Jewish
minority.49 The 1939-1941 occupation of Eastern Poland by the Soviets resulted in hardships
that came in the form of political and cultural repression. These traumatic experiences that
lasted half a decade in Poland play a large role in how Poles perceive their surroundings, along
with their interactions with states they perceived as threats and those that they perceived as
allies. Therefore, one of Poland’s main goals today is self-preservation in light of the recent
Russian use of military force in Ukraine.
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Along with Poland’s historically based fear of invasion and domination from larger
powers, these events in the past brought with them another terror: abandonment. Poland had
military alliances with its Western counterparts, namely France and the United Kingdom, who
promised armed assistance to Poland in the event of military aggression from its neighbors. It
was stated on many occasions that Britain and France, some of the largest military forces in
Europe, would assist Poland in the event of invasion as tensions grew as Germany’s
expansionist intentions became more apparent. British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain
stated on March 31, 1939, “In the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish
independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with
their national forces, His Majesty’s Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend
the Polish Government all support in their power.”50 This led to the signing of the “Agreement
of Mutual Assistance between the United Kingdom and Poland” on August 25, 1939, which
expressed British military support for Poland in the event of German aggression.51 France also
verbally shared the same intentions of its British ally to uphold Polish independence, even to
the extent of using force if necessary. “The Franco-Polish alliance is, moreover, confirmed in the
same spirit by the French Government and the Polish government. France and Poland
guarantee each other immediate and direct aid against any threat direct or indirect.”52 This
would create an air of trust between the three countries that would lead to Poland later to
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follow the direct instructions of the U.K and France to rely on them for military assistance and
not fully mobilize, as this would potentially instigate armed conflict with the Germans.53
This fear of abandonment runs farther back than the Second World War. L. Jay Oliva in
his article “France, Russia and the Abandonment of Poland: The Seven Years War” argues that
Poland’s fear of abandonment from its Western Allies has roots in historical memory far
predating the 20th century.54 According to Oliva, Poland and the majority of Western Europe at
the time were fearful of the growing powers of the Austrian and Russian Empires, and were
thus creating alliances to help balance the playing field. French diplomats were assuring their
Polish counterparts that France was committed to ensuring Polish sovereignty in light of
encroaching imperialism by Poland’s neighbors and that Poland could count on French support
should conflict arise. Russia, at the time, was looking to advance its army through Poland to
attack Prussia on the other side. Poland feared that Russia would use this as an opportunity to
seize Polish land with the soldiers passing through, threatening its sovereignty. France,
although in a previous agreement with Poland, found its diplomats and politicians debating
heavily amongst themselves whether it was more important to uphold its agreement with
Poland or pursue other advantageous geo-political relationships, namely with Russia itself. The
decision to leave Poland isolated ultimately led to the country’s partition and the end of Polish
sovereignty for over a century.
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As is well known, however, although the German invasion of Poland over one-hundred
and fifty years later brought declarations of war from Poland’s Western allies, it again did not
bring the tangible military assistance Poland anticipated. The German military made quick work
of the unprepared Polish army and used momentary diplomacy with the Soviets to create a
two-front conflict for the Poles that the already strained Polish military forces strategically
could not win. This would, of course, lead to the horrific events in Poland that have become
ingrained in the country’s collective memory. Obviously, these events would cause the Polish
people and government to take actions that would prevent any such calamity from occurring
again. With its history in mind, what actions has Poland taken in recent years that reflect this
desire for self-preservation in light of external threats and potential desertion?
Mobilizing Memory
Firstly, Poland has taken steps to rekindle its relationships with its Western European
counterparts. Following the fall of the Soviet Union, Poland quickly became a partner of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1996 and soon after became a full member in
1999.55 Poland subsequently then joined its neighbors politically and economically in the
European Union in 2004 through the Treaty of Accession. These changes, following the many
years of Soviet control, sought to rebuild the pre-World War II connections that Poland was
barred from having as a member of the Soviet Bloc. Poland then became the largest
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beneficiary of European Union funding, netting sixty-seven billion Euros from European Union
budgeting since 2004.56
Poland has also taken steps beyond diplomacy that seek to ensure its survival
considering the past, namely increasing its military capacity. In January of 2021, Poland
launched a wargame operation titled “Winter-20” that sought to test Polish military ability in
the hypothetical scenario of a Russian invasion.57 The Poles wished to test the effectiveness of
their military units and new technology in a controlled environment against what they
perceived as a potential looming threat. The result was a Polish defeat. It should be clearly
noted that the exact results of the exercise were not officially publicized, and also that there
has been a notable propaganda campaign undertaken by Russia and China mocking the
underwhelming results of the exercise.58 Nonetheless, whether the result was defeat in less
than a week or longer and more drawn out conflict, Poland’s actions in the immediate following
months with the large changes it made to its military seem to indicate they were not satisfied
with the results.
Poland in the following months, after seeing the result of its military experiment,
immediately made changes to its military. In October of 2021, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the Polish
Deputy Prime Minister, announced his intention to accelerate the growth of the Polish military,
doubling its number to two-hundred and fifty-thousand service members.59 Along with
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doubling their personnel, the Poles also wished to update their military technology that was still
largely comprised of Soviet-era technology.60 This large expansion of military capability may
seem out of place; however considering the past experiences of Poland these decisions become
more clear.
Poland clearly wants to establish strong bonds with Western Europe to help continue its
economic development following communist rule and to join hands in military alliances with its
neighbors against potential threats, but they also are taking steps to become more
independent with regard to their security. Poland realizes that solely relying on Western
Europe for assistance against invasions, namely from Russia, has not been in their best
interests. It is also of note that Poland chose Russia as the invading force in their military
exercise. Poland realizes that geographically they would be among Russia’s first targets if they
wanted to expand into European Union member states and that historically Russian rule has
been disastrous. The fear of being abandoned once again to foreign Russian subjugation
following invasion is not lost on Poland’s current leadership. Therefore, they are now taking
further steps to ensure Poland’s security for the future. This comes in the form of the Eastern
Partnership that helps secure a geographic buffer between themselves and Russia, and also an
increase in military capability. Instead of Poland looking outward for protection, its leaders are
looking to what they can do to improve their situation and protect themselves from another
catastrophe.
Polish support for The Eastern Partnership, although having a deep historic precedent,
begins to show the separation between Poland’s international goals and Western Europe’s. In
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2008, Poland and Sweden launched a joint proposal for the inclusion of Eastern
“Neighborhood” countries in a trade and foreign relations partnership titled “The Eastern
Partnership” (EaP) that included Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and (at the
time) Belarus.61 The goal for those involved were to enhance relations with these countries and
form better economic trade agreements to benefit both these developing countries and the
European Union itself. Poland, following the implementation of the partnership in 2009, would
become heavily invested in it. Poland in 2021 was the Ukraine’s second largest trading partner,
surpassing even Russia, and became a large hub for Ukraine’s migrant labor.62 Economically,
this is a benefit of having Ukraine, a large economy in its own right, expanding trade relations
with a European Union member state. Poland also sent seventy-five million dollars to Belarus
aid their opposition movement to rigged elections.63 Increasing trade and trying to support
democratic development in these new partner countries seem like objectives that Poland and
the rest of the European Union would have in common. Unfortunately, this is not the case as
other European Union member states believe member states should tread more lightly with
regards to foreign relations with these Eastern Neighborhood states.
The level of involvement that Poland and the rest of the European Union feels is
appropriate for these new Eastern Partnership states is a current point of contention. Piotr
Buras, Head of the Warsaw office of the European Council on Foreign Relations, explained in an
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article how Poland and the European Union member states to its west differ on their policy
views regarding the Eastern Partnership. He states that Warsaw has a historical interest in
these states acceding to the European Union as Poland did in the past. This interest comes
from the concern of recent Russian expansionism, which Poland has experienced many times
before, and from the cultural similarities it shares with these states as former Soviet-dominated
territories.64 Warsaw wishes for these states to become more and more integrated into
European affairs and one day be granted access as member states of the European Union.65
Other countries disagreed, mainly due to the concern of instigating a hostile Russian response.
Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, many countries were concerned about further
potential Russian expansion deeper into Ukraine or other former Soviet territories. Therefore,
many of Poland’s counterparts in Western Europe advocated for a less zealous approach and
questioned the need for bringing in these other countries that could cause Russia to feel like
the European Union was encroaching. The stance of keeping the Eastern Partnership states in a
sort of perpetual limbo was to the ire of Poland who felt they could potentially be deprived of
the buffer between themselves and Russia that they so deeply desire. It should be noted that a
new consensus could be on the horizon following the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine, which
now has galvanized support for Ukraine’s E.U Membership. The invasion and its senseless
violence may have indirectly helped solidify the increasingly shaky relations between Poland
and the European Union.
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The issue of the Eastern
Partnership raises an interesting question,
could two individuals look at a country
through the lens of Strategic Culture and
come to different conclusions about its
future goals? Initially, looking at Poland’s
history and collective trauma of invasion
would logically lead to the assumption that its leadership would want to work more hand in
hand with the European Union. That researcher could use PEW research polls showing that this
sentiment is reflected in recent Polish responses concerning their favorable views towards the
EU.66 There are, however, instances where Poland’s policy decisions and rhetoric counteract
this goal of a cooperative relationship with its EU allies. The question then arises, could
another researcher studying Poland’s past in another context come up with a different result
that would suggest a different outcome? Studying Poland’s cultural past may give insight into
some of Poland’s contradictory stances its ruling parties take but may raise questions on the
determinism and utility of Strategic Culture.

66

Christine Huang and Laura Clancy, “Spotlight on Poland: Negative Views of Russia Surge, but Ratings for U.S.,
NATO, EU Improve,” Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project (Pew Research Center, June 22, 2022),
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2022/06/22/spotlight-on-poland-negative-views-of-russia-surge-but-ratingsfor-u-s-nato-eu-improve/. (Date Accessed 31 August 2022)

45

Chapter 4
A Sacred Nation: Poland’s Cultural History and its Effects
Jasna Gora: From Story to Symbol
Part of understanding Poland’s culture is to recognize the importance the Catholic
Church had in the country during its years of subjugation in the twentieth century. Catholicism
first came to Poland in the tenth century and grew as the centuries passed. As it stands now,
Catholicism is now the overwhelmingly dominant religion of Poland as recent demographic
studies from 2013-2019 have between 94.9%-86% of the Polish population identifying as
Catholics.67 68 This easily surpasses other countries with predominantly Catholic populations,
thus making Poland the country with the largest Catholic majority. Although participation has
fallen in recent years, and the fall was accelerated due to the COVID-19 pandemic, still about
half of the country’s population consider themselves practicing Catholics and are actively
involved with their parishes.69 How the Catholic Church became so influential in Polish life and
culture also has a history and its position in cultural memory is important to analyze if one
wishes to understand how Poland views the world.
Catholicism rose to prominence in Poland, as most religious identities do, in contrast to
those around it. Linda Colley details this idea thoroughly in Britons as the British identify
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themselves as Protestant to contrast themselves from their French rivals and slowly started to
rally around their newfound Protestant identity.70 Although Britain was not always a
predominantly Protestant country historically, it slowly became how Britons identified
themselves because it helped them differentiate themselves from those they viewed as
“other”. Poland, likewise, behaved similarly following the establishment of Latin Catholicism.
Poland finds itself historically surrounded by non-Catholics. With the German population being
historically Protestant following the Reformation and Russia traditionally being Eastern
Orthodox, Catholicism would come to be viewed as a large differentiating factor between
Poland and its neighbors.
The genesis of the adoption of Catholicism into Polish cultural identity is best
exemplified by the failed Siege of the Jasna Gora Monastery and the following events. During
the events known as “the Deluge” during the Second Northern War in the 17 th century, Sweden
invaded Poland to loot and dominate the country. The Swedes, after a string of successful
battles and sieges, failed in their month-long siege of the Jasna Gora Monastery in the
Czestochowa region in Poland. In 1655, Polish forces successfully held off the Protestant
Swedish invading forces and this became a turning point for the conflict where Poland would
eventually gain the advantage.71 The Poles’ boost in morale came from the claims the victory
was achieved because of the assistance of the Black Madonna icon which was located within
the monastery. According to tradition and the Conference of Polish Bishops, the Virgin Mary

70

Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2012). 33-36
Paul Robert Magocsi, “Poland-Lithuania, the Habsburgs, Hungary-Croatia, and Transylvania, 16th–17th
Centuries.” In Historical Atlas of Central Europe: Third Revised and Expanded Edition, 59–62. University of Toronto
Press, 2018. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3138/j.ctv9hvr64.24. (Date Accessed: 26 September 2022)
71

47

appeared to an Italian priest asking him to call her the Queen of Poland.72 Following the
unlikely victory at Jasna Gora, the Virgin Mary was credited for the miraculous victory and, in
1656, King of Poland John II Casimir formally declared her the Queen of Poland.73 Poland holds
these events as a symbolic representation of clinging on to Catholicism in the face of external
threats from non-Catholic invaders. A Polish artist, January Suchodolski, in his 1845 painting of
the event helps give a glimpse into how the event
was understood.74 The viewer not only sees the
conflict between Polish and Swedish forces, but
also, in the center of the action, two Catholic
monks in monastic dress. The forefront monk is
holding a crucifix, a recognizable Catholic symbol,
while the one behind him is actively in the fight
with a rifle in hand. Overhead, on the top left-hand corner, a banner of the “Our Lady of
Czestochowa” (Black Madonna) icon flies overhead, communicating to the viewer not only
what the Polish forces are protecting but also their belief that the Blessed Virgin was overseeing
the battle.
The Polish sentiment of rallying around Catholicism stretched far beyond the
seventeenth century into the twentieth century. This symbol of the resistance at Jasna Gora
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would become a rallying cry for Poles under the control of the Soviet-backed communist
regime. During the Soviet-pressured crackdowns in Poland, Ronald Reagan invited Cardinal
John Krol, a Polish-American priest, to a rally conveniently located at the National Shrine of Our
Lady of Czestochowa in Doylestown, Pennsylvania.75 This gesture obviously had large symbolic
meaning to the Polish population, and Paul Kengor in his book A Pope and a President quoted
some Polish Catholics to get their reactions to the event and one in particular stated Reagan
was “a man of truth, who acted according to his beliefs, which were the same as ours. We
knew he would not betray us.”76
Faith and Resistance: Pope John Paul II as an Embodied Symbol
As aforementioned, authors such as Thum and Keenan have detailed the role
Catholicism played in Poland in the years following the Second World War. Although the Polish
communist party wished to create the myth of the “Polish settler” to justify the expulsion of
ethnic Germans and replace them with Polish counterparts, the traditions of the Polish people
that stemmed from their ties to the Catholic church became a point of contention. Marxism is
hostile to religion, and the Polish communist party constantly found itself at odds with the
people regarding faith. Elizabeth Valkenier in her article “The Catholic Church in Communist
Poland” details the troubles the Polish Catholic Church and Holy See gave to the communist
overseers of the country. She details how the traditional values that accompany Catholicism,
such as democracy, private property rights, and marriage legislation were at odds with the
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ideology that the Polish communist regime championed.77 The Soviet-bloc ruling parties sought
to censor the Catholic press, which often was critical of communism. In addition, the Polish
communist party knew it would not find success by directly attacking the Polish Catholic Church
in the press following the post-war revival, so they launched an intense propaganda campaign
against the Holy See, insinuating the Pope had pro-German sympathies.78 This, of course, did
not lead to productive results as the Polish Catholic Church remained an influential and
permanent part of Polish life during the years of Soviet rule. This resistant attitude to
communist rule would symbolically culminate in 1978 with the election of Polish Archbishop
and Cardinal Karol Jozef Wojtyla to become Pope, taking the name John Paul II.
The Polish Pope John Paul II would inspire and reinvigorate the faith of the Polish people
during his tenure, and during his time as Pope, Poland would see the Soviet Union fall, and its
sovereignty was regained once more. John Paul II was the first non-Italian pope to be elected
to the position in almost four-hundred years, which symbolically struck a chord with many
Poles faithful to the Catholic Church during a time when their faith was not supported by their
government. Biographer David Willey, who travelled alongside the Pope during his visit to
Poland, was quoted as saying, “The rise of the Solidarity movement and indeed Poland’s
subsequent transition from Communist dictatorship under Soviet tutelage to the first nonCommunist government in Eastern Europe, can be traced directly back to the sense of
patriotism, purpose, and optimism generated by the Pope’s bold visit to Poland a decade
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before.”79 Kenneth S. Zagacki in his 2001 article “Pope John Paul II and the Crusade against
Communism: A Case Study in Secular and Sacred Time” expands on this statement by Willey by
detailing John Paul II’s rhetoric and actions that called Poland to reject communism and cling to
Catholicism.80 John Paul II often contrasted the sacred, transcendental values of Catholicism
against the secular, materialist values of Marxism and called his Polish countrymen to rally
around their faith in resistance to their communist overseers. Poland would see a revival of
their faith during John Paul II’s time as pope, especially with his iconic visit to the country after
his election to the papacy which helped solidify the two main factors of Polish cultural history in
relation to the Catholic tradition: faith and resistance.
Contextualizing “Polish Schizophrenia”
Poland’s cultural history of faith and resistance to external political and religious
influence makes Poland’s future path unclear. Relying on classic cost-benefit analysis, which is
what Realism and some early forms of Strategic Culture heavily rely on, one would see Poland’s
goals of cooperating with their Western European allies to strengthen relations in the face of
Russian threats of violent expansion while continuing to receive financial support from the
European Union as relatively straightforward. Oddly, the Law and Justice Party, a right-wing
and Eurosceptic political party, has found success on Poland’s domestic front. To be clear, the
party does not represent the full Polish populace as the party does have stark opposition on the
homefront. However, they have been successful in elections and retaining power. Often
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colloquially referred to as “Polish Schizophrenia”, these seemingly contradicting actions
undertaken by Poland come across as utterly confusing to outsiders.
The study of Polish cultural history and observation of its
seemingly current support of political parties that seemingly are
very distrustful of the European Union may lead to an
uncomfortable conclusion that Poland may indeed feel militarily
threatened by Russia to its East, but culturally threatened by their
friends in the West. As Poland found itself emerging from Soviet domination and acceding to
the European Union in 2004, they looked around and saw a Europe whose values were
becoming more and more alien to the traditional ones Poles championed. Issues such as
abortion and advancements made for LGBTQ rights run counterintuitive to the values of the
Catholic Church that promotes things like the traditional family and traditional views of
sexuality. Poles, who once proudly rallied around its Catholicism during its darkest times to find
inspiration and hope, now finds itself criticized by its Western neighbors for their faith-based
beliefs. President Andrzej Duda, during his reelection campaign in 2020, stated that LGBT
“ideology” was worse than communism.81 This sentiment has cropped up in other parts of the
country that have formally declared their districts as “LBGT-Ideology Free Zones” (Strefy wolne
od ideologii LGBT) where support for the advancement of LGBT policy is severely restricted.82
The first image is a sticker detailing a Pride-flag (a commonly recognized symbol for the LGBT
community) with a black “X” drawn through it, surrounded by the words “LGBT FREE ZONE” in
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Polish. The author of the article, Lucy Ash, details how the Archbishop of Krakow warned of a
“neo-Marxist rainbow plague” that is sweeping across Europe and Poland, and that in response
nearly a third of Poland’s territory has taken up the title of LGBT Ideology Free. 83 These
displays and statements have drawn the ire of EU which has their executives reminding Poland
of the non-discrimination principles which Poland is expected to adhere to as a member state.
With regards to abortion, Poland has some of the strictest abortion bans in Europe,
which necessarily has drawn some criticism from media outlets and caused friction between
Polish courts and EU courts. The journalist William Nattrass wrote an article aptly titled
“Poland’s abortion culture war is a battle for the country’s soul” which discussed Polish
abortion policy that was the center of discussion after a Bialystok hospital refused an abortion
to a woman who was told her child had no chance of survival.84 This decision gained national
attention as it became the centerpiece for an already raging discussion about abortion rights in
the country. Instead of focusing on whether he agreed with the decision or not, Nattrass takes
a different approach and discusses how issues like this are not simply sowing division internally,
but externally. Nattrass explains that while Western Europe in the twentieth century was
gradually removing faith from policy to reach a more rational, enlightened state, Poland was
fighting against the Soviet Union to have faith reinstated.85 He reminds the reader that outlier
political groups in the country, such as the United Right, have been pushing a Polexit movement
and insinuates that these cultural disagreements could be fuel for the movement. He states
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directly in the middle of the paper, “Freedom from Communism also means freedom of faith,
which for most Poles, means freedom to be Catholic.”86 If the European Union continues to
press Poland regarding value differences, it could potentially be a flashpoint for larger scale
disagreements between the two.
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Chapter 5

Potential Application
Influencing Outcomes
Considering all this information, could one plausibly predict the future decisions of a
country by studying its past? Due to the multitude of factors, some of them contradicting,
there is simply no possibility of using Strategic Culture to predict the future with one-hundred
percent certainty. Simply put, countries are still run by human beings who are inevitably, and
most often frustratingly, unpredictable. They can make decisions that seem logical in light of
geopolitical realities, or act in a way that seems to outside observers completely ludicrous and
detrimental to their security goals. Echevarria’s recent article “Strategic Culture is not a Silver
Bullet” helps explain the limitations of Strategic Culture.87 He explains that, although he is a
supporter or Strategic Culture, it is not a methodology that will solve all the problems decisionmakers have when trying to make important calls. He yearns for a practicality that he feels the
subject lacks, so that when there are lives and money to be lost, it can be applied.88 The author
has fair concerns about using Strategic Culture as an all-encompassing analytical tool, but his
interpretation of it almost forces it to be. He wants Strategic Culture to be used on the
battlefield and produce measurable results. Obviously, the battlefield has the highest stakes
because lives are on the line, and therefore in that context it would need more absolute
certainty in specific circumstances. The argument in this paper is that Strategic Culture is not a
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cure-all and that it is best suited to situations before warfare is even considered. The
battlefield requires more definitive strategies, while the goal of international security through
bettering international relations has more nuance.
Strategic Culture may not be able to say for sure what a country’s future actions will be,
but it can show possible future outcomes for relations with a country and therefore help
policymakers behave in ways that achieve optimal results. Looking at the full context of a
country’s historical culture, analysts and policy makers can think of possible outcomes and
weigh whether these outcomes are possible or not. The goal would be to make the bad
outcomes less possible and the better outcomes more. A useful scale would be: “Very Likely”,
“Likely”, “Unlikely”, and “Very Unlikely” and if one uses Strategic Culture situationally, they
should be able to sort out potential future scenarios into these categories.
The next step is to take some scenarios involving Poland and apply this scale of
likelihood. Firstly, what are the chances that Poland cooperates with the European Union
extensively throughout the Ukraine crisis? The answer would be, “Very Likely” considering the
fact that support for the EU is still high among citizens and has increased in light of the Russian
invasion. Although Poland has been having conflicts with the EU over domestic cultural and
judicial issues, a looming Russian threat is a more pressing matter than ideological disputes.
Second, what is the chance Poland leaves the European Union in a Brexit-like fashion? The
answer would be “Unlikely”. Although the “Polexit” movement is a fringe movement and
Russia’s military action will probably help Poland and the EU strengthen ties through
cooperation, the fact remains that there are still deep cultural disputes between Poland and
other EU member states. UKIP was once considered a marginal fringe movement many years
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ago, but it still grew and eventually resulted in Brexit. These reasons are why Poland leaving in
the future is unlikely, but not very unlikely.
Rethinking Solutions
Considering the historical and cultural context, along with the addition of events and
geopolitical issues that are enveloping Europe currently, the issue of Poland’s future path needs
to be addressed. Objectively, it would be geopolitically disastrous for Poland to leave the
European Union in a Brexit-like manner. Unlike Poland, the United Kingdom had the
geographic privilege of being an island and not part of the contingent European mainland when
factoring in its decision. Poland is situated, as it has always been, as the state between
Western Europe and Eastern Europe. With the current encroachment of Russia into
neighboring states to its west, namely Belarus and Ukraine, Poland has the potentiality of
finding itself as a border state between the European Union and expanding Russia.89
International Security has an important component of prevention and using Strategic Culture
we can try to foresee scenarios that keep Poland’s geographic realities and collective memory
in mind.
Communication between European Union states and Poland needs to be addressed for
future success. A recent study showed that among the European states, after totaling the
number of times they have contacted one another, Poland found itself to be among the least
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contacted countries.90 A country that has the geographic, economic, and cultural importance of
Poland certainly would warrant more attention diplomatically than what it has received.
Although there may be arguments from the European Union members that claim that the funds
Poland receives from the E.U and NATO should qualify as amicable relations, more can still be
done to increase fraternity between Poland and the E.U and increased communication would
be a phenomenal start. Whether that takes the shape of more formal visits from ambassadors
or more involvement from other policymakers, it would be in the best interest of both parties
to strengthen communication and subsequently improve relations.
A prime example of this idea of increased interaction with Poland is its relationship with
the United States. The United States is a country with a large sphere of influence as well as
tremendous military capacity, yet this does not lead Polish leadership to be skeptical by default.
The United States and Poland have a history of supporting each other’s sovereignty that
extends all the way back to the genesis of the United States as an independent country with
Poles like Tadeusz Kouciszko actively aiding the colonies in their struggle against British Rule.
This amicability would extend into the twentieth century with President Woodrow Wilson
advocating for the reinstatement of an independent Polish state following the conclusion of the
First World War.91 This American recognition of Poland’s importance extended through the
twentieth century as every United States President following Richard Nixon in 1972 has visited
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Poland during their time in office.92 The mutual respect between the countries even went as
far as Polish President Duda offering to help fund a United States military base in Poland, that
had shared strategic interests for both countries.93 This offer, along with Poland’s history of
amicable relations with the United States exemplifies the fact that Poland is not averse to
working with superpowers with a vastly superior military simply due to some paranoid fear of
outside influence. If Poland feels that another country’s goals do not conflict with their own
goals and values, based on modern and historical precedent it would stand to reason they
would be happy to cooperate. Poland simply wishes to remain sovereign over its own destiny,
which includes protecting the national identity Poles have forged for themselves. Increasing
communication between the European Union and Poland to clarify the importance of the
relationship and find ways to meet each other’s needs without alienating the other side should
be a top goal moving forward.
An example of an idea that could benefit relations between Western European Union
member states and Poland would be a revisiting of migration policy as members of the
European Union. A large source of contention between the European Union and Poland was in
direct relation to Poland’s staunch opposition to European Union immigration and refugee
policy.94 Poland, viewing the E.U’s attempts of enforcing the policies as overreach, announced
to the world that the sovereignty of Polish high courts will not be superseded by external courts
92

Poland - Travels of the President - Travels - Department History - Office of the Historian (state.gov) *current
President Joseph R. Biden has not yet travelled to Poland
93
David Welna, “Polish President Wants U.S. Military Base,” NPR (NPR, September 19, 2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/09/19/649432650/polish-president-wants-u-s-military-base (Date Accessed 9
September 2022)
94
Adam Leszczyński, “'Poles Don't Want Immigrants. They Don't Understand Them, Don't like Them'.” The
Guardian. (Guardian News and Media, July 2, 2015.) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/02/polesdont-want-immigrants-they-dont-understand-them-dont-like-them. (Date Accessed: 3 September 2022)

59

that the PiS government found in conflict with Polish laws. The Russian invasion of Ukraine
completely changed the tune of Poland’s refugee policy as millions of Ukrainian refugees fled
into Poland to escape the violence at home. Due to Poland’s lack of experience on the matter
of integrating refugees, writers such as Mateusz Mazzini predicted that Poland’s heartwarming
display of humanitarianism to the Ukrainian refugees would bring new struggles to the
country.95 A country that was ranked one-hundred and first globally with the number of
refugees it was hosting prior to the invasion found itself second in the world in a matter of
three weeks.96 According to Mazzini, the initial display of compassion by the Polish people and
government was inspiring, but soon struggled with the prospect of supporting over one and a
half million people in need.97 Mazzini is critical of Poland for accepting these refugees while
turning away others from Africa and the Middle East, which is an easy criticism to make.
However, it creates an opportunity for EU leaders to work with Poland to reshaped and rethink
common immigration policy. This would help the European Union feel like it is making progress
with Poland while helping Poland have a say in the matter become a part of the decisionmaking process. Current day events, dark as they may be, could create a new environment
where Poland and the E.U can increase cooperation and move forward together as stronger
allies.
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Conclusion
In summary, this thesis finds that in order to fully understand a country’s strategic
objectives, a deeper understanding of the country’s history, namely its historical narrative, will
elucidate the cultural lens they see the world through and thus help explain their seemingly
irrational decisions. Poland has immense strategic importance to Europe and the European
Union, thus it would stand to reason that diplomats and political leaders be proactive in their
approach to interacting with them. Although Strategic Culture may indeed assist in
understanding how a nation conducts warfare and violence, it is of utmost interest to national
security to take preventative measures where possible to prevent violent outcomes. Even if a
physical security threat emerges from the country being examined, the information gathered in
these preemptive stages would transfer over to the traditional application of Strategic Culture,
thus making this approach more efficient than trying to collect data once the stakes are at their
highest. This methodology can be used with both allies and rivals, it is simply up to strategists
to determine what nations they deem as the most pressing in terms of security concerns and
begin their analysis there.
Historical narrative is the vehicle that drives Strategic Culture and connects it to the
other aspects that are traditionally analyzed. Without an understanding of historical narrative,
the symbols a country uses to express itself or an idea, the identity that it has adopted to
describe itself, even the historical events themselves that it experienced are simply factoids
that lack proper context. What is necessary for an analyst, researcher, or strategist to fully
understand the cultural influences that shape a country’s strategic thinking to firmly grasp the
narrative that encapsulates those influences.
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The second chapter of this thesis sought to find the link between a country’s identity
and its historical narrative. Identities, like narratives, are chosen and morph over time as
changes and events occur. Historical events, and the narratives that surround them, are the
fixed points that identities orient themselves around and they help to create a shared tradition
that links people to their past. Just as the British formed their identity by differentiating
themselves from their European rivals, first Catholic Spain and then France, Poland formed its
identity following the Second World War and solidified it in opposition to their Soviet-backed
rulers. The rapid changes to Poland’s cultural formation following the fateful events of the
Second World War make for an insightful case study regarding the formation of identity and its
aftereffects.
The third chapter sought to determine if historical narratives affect strategic decisions in
the present and provided examples to demonstrate that Poland’s interpretations of its past
have indeed played a part in its current geopolitical choices. Authors such as Michael Kolton
provided a framework through their analysis of the historical precedent of other countries’
strategic policy and this thesis adopted the same approach. Clearly, in the case of Poland,
historical themes such as abandonment, defenselessness, and fear of Russian aggression are
tied together in a narrative that impacts the country’s current day strategies. Therefore,
Strategic Culture does have utility because understanding a country’s perception of its past
helps policymakers and strategists understand that country’s decisions today.
The fourth chapter argued that it is imperative for a researcher to have a firm grasp on a
country’s historical narrative before being able to analyze its overall Strategic Culture. The
“symbols” and “metaphors” authors such as Alistair Johnston point to as parts that build
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Strategic Culture may not be fully understood if they are not studied in the context they
stemmed from. In short, it is not simply enough to know that Poland has symbols, metaphors,
and traditions that have meaning to them, one must know why these things have meaning in
the first place. This method allows researchers to not only understand longstanding symbols
and traditions, but also helps them understand new symbols as they arise.
Lastly, the fifth chapter aimed to provide solutions to contemporary Polish problems in
its external relations. Strengthening relationships with other countries should always be the
goal of anyone interested in national security, because those relationships help prevent
potential disastrous outcomes. The aggressive actions that Russia has taken recently may
provide an opportunity for increase communication and cooperation between Poland and the
European Union. Ideally, it will help Poland see that multilateral cooperation is crucial for its
and Europe’s long-term security, if simultaneously Western Europe works to approach Poland
less as a rule enforcer and more as a partner.
In conclusion, this thesis finds that there are historical narratives that are the base for a
country’s Strategic Culture. Therefore, for the methodology of studying a country through the
lens of Strategic Culture to have utility it must necessarily begin with a proper understanding of
the dominant narrative. Although narratives are not set in stone and may change over time,
policymakers will always find themselves influenced by their surrounding culture and that
culture is shaped by distant echoes from a collective memory that they share with their
countrymen.
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